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‘Constituting a problem in themselves’ 
Countering covert Chinese activity in India: The Life and Death of the Chinese 
Intelligence Section, 1944-1946 
 
Abstract 
This article explores the actions taken to address the issue of covert Chinese activities in India 
during the Second World War identified by Force 136, the Far East incarnation of the Special 
Operations Executive (SOE), which resulted in the creation of the Chinese Intelligence Section 
(CIS) in early 1945. It considers this development within the wider context of security 
intelligence in relation to British India, which has been the subject of increased academic study 
in recent years as a result of the increased availability of relevant archival material. The need 
for CIS to be established draws attention to the parameters within which the various 
intelligence and security agencies operated, their attention focused primarily upon clearly 
identifiable threats to British rule, particularly nationalism and communism. The issue of 
covert Chinese activity in India did not fit easily within this framework; the manner in which 
SOE’s concerns were ultimately addressed illustrates how the prevailing colonial security 
mindset shaped the conceptual horizons of security intelligence activity. 
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Article 
This article explores the actions taken to address the issue of covert Chinese activities 
in India during the Second World War identified by Force 136, the Far East incarnation of the 
Special Operations Executive (SOE), which resulted in the creation of the Chinese Intelligence 
Section (CIS) in early 1945. Insodoing, it illustrates a unique response on the part of the 
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Special Operations Executive (SOE) towards foreign nationals in its employ who were 
suspected of conducting a dual role; specifically, its Nationalist (KMT) Chinese agents, who 
were thought to be engaged in intelligence gathering in India on behalf of Chiang Kai-Shek 
while contributing to the covert war against the Japanese. The study also offers something 
more than an interesting footnote to the history of SOE, and can be placed within the wider 
context of intelligence and security issues at the twilight of British rule in India. SOE’s efforts 
to address its concerns about Chinese recruits, along with the ultimate form taken by the 
Chinese Intelligence Section, provide us with an insight into the limitations of the work of the 
intelligence and security authorities, in both Delhi and London, which focused their attention, 
unsurprisingly, upon those threats that had clear potential to damage British interests. Through 
the study of the specific problem faced by SOE in terms of the reliability of its Chinese agents, 
this article aims to explore how security concerns that failed to fit easily within the parameters 
of imperial security were dealt with; specifically, how the problem posed by India’s Chinese 
population was addressed. 
Increased availability of archival material from the 1990s onwards has resulted in 
greater academic interest in the role of Britain’s intelligence and security apparatus during the 
twilight years of the British empire. Studies that explore the activities of the various agencies 
either in specific imperial territories, or in relation to the British empire more generally, have 
followed. A number of works have explored security and intelligence issues in relation to 
British India, building upon Richard Popplewell’s pioneering Intelligence and Imperial 
Defence, which chronicled the development of a security-intelligence apparatus in the early 
years of the twentieth century that, while small scale, was nevertheless global in its reach.1 
Further details about that apparatus have since emerged. Patrick French has illustrated the part 
played by the security and intelligence authorities in the maintenance of British rule in India 
beyond the 1920s and until independence, pointing in particular to the ‘central role’ of the 
London-based Indian Political Intelligence (IPI), which was ‘devoted to the internal and 
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external security of British India’, working in conjunction with the Delhi-based Intelligence 
Bureau (DIB or IB), the Indian equivalent of MI5.2 Kate O’Malley’s research into the links 
between Indian and Irish independence movements has provided further insight into IPI 
operations.3 More recent studies have seen a shift in organisational emphasis away from the 
Bureau and IPI; both Christopher Andrew and Calder Walton have drawn attention to the role 
of the Security Service (MI5), emphasising its imperial credentials and exploring its role 
during, and in the aftermath of, independence, culminating in the agreement of the Indian 
authorities for an MI5 Security Liaison Officer to be stationed with the Bureau.4 Andrew and 
Walton also emphasise the distinction between the activities of MI5 and police special 
branches, which have been the subject of some attention in relation to colonial security matters, 
arguing that ‘colonial policing, which involved law and order, was not the same as imperial 
security intelligence, which involved national security, and operated in a realm outside the 
confines of law enforcement’.5 Attention has also been drawn to MI5’s continued interest in 
independent India as a member of the Commonwealth.6 
 Through these studies, which provide an insight into the work of the various 
intelligence and security agencies concerned, we can discern what were considered, from the 
British perspective, to be the main threats to internal security in India, at the heart of which lay 
Indian nationalism, and the struggle for independence. During the early years of the twentieth 
century, security was threatened by the challenge to British rule posed by the Indian 
revolutionary movement, whose ‘revolutionary terrorism’ included an assassination attempt on 
the viceroy, Lord Hardinge, in December 1912.7 While some continued to advocate the use of 
force to achieve their goal, the nonviolent path adopted by Congress during the interwar years 
was complicated by the emergence of Communism, which added a new dimension to the 
nationalist threat to the security of British India. As Walton notes, while MI5, along with IPI 
and the Bureau continued ‘to keep a close watch on the main anti-colonial political leaders in 
India’, the main focus ‘increasingly became communist agents travelling between Britain and 
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India’, with files being opened on ‘many Congress and Muslim league leaders…not because 
the intelligence agencies viewed Congress and the Muslim league as “subversive”…but 
because some of their members were known or suspected to be closely affiliated with 
communism’.8 All of this supports Richard Aldrich’s observation that ‘British colonial 
governments in India, Malaya and Hong Kong…developed, over decades, effective, if 
narrowly focused, security intelligence services designed to address internal threats from 
nationalists, communists or other types of “agitators”’.9 But what about other concerns and 
perceived threats to Indian internal security that failed to conform to this prevailing British 
colonial mindset? As Aldrich continues, the same security apparatus effectively ignored ‘the 
problems of external foreign threats and potential adversaries in Asia’, such as Japan and 
China. Concerns over covert Chinese activity in India, an issue that blurred the distinction 
between internal and external threats, do not figure prominently in the existing studies detailed 
above, which tend – reasonably enough – to follow the grain of the newly available archival 
material. This article does not seek to claim the discovery of a ‘missing dimension’ in the 
existing literature. Rather, the absence can be considered an accurate reflection of the priorities 
of the intelligence and security agencies themselves. As such, its significance lies in what it 
suggests about the limitations of the British colonial security mindset.  
 
I 
While remaining low throughout the nineteenth century, Chinese settlement in India, focused 
primarily upon Calcutta, began to grow during the early twentieth century, in part a 
consequence of the ongoing struggle between the Nationalists and Communists in China 
during the interwar years.10 The figure continued to rise following the onset of the Second 
World War, as Chinese troops were despatched to India to shore up British forces in Burma. In 
late 1942, over 20,000 Chinese soldiers arrived at Ramgarh, close to the Burmese border, 
where they ‘established a little extra-territorial concession’.11 This development led the 
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Government of India to establish the Chinese Intelligence Wing (CIW) under Brigadier Walter 
Cawthorn, Director of Intelligence from India Command.12 Alongside these developments, the 
Delhi-based Intelligence Bureau (IB), the organisation responsible for security intelligence 
throughout India, also began to extend its interest in Chinese affairs. Initially, the Bureau’s 
attention was focused upon a very specific security issue; the various ways in which the 
Japanese were feared to be employing Chinese agents to gather intelligence.13 Over the 
following months, the Bureau began to turn its attention to the activities of India’s Chinese 
population more widely. A significant shift took place in August 1941, at which point the 
Bureau acknowledged that ‘very little’ was known about Chinese activity in India, and 
suggested that it ‘would be worthwhile paying special attention to all forms of Chinese activity 
in this country, as constituting a problem in themselves’.14 This development was supported by 
the Government of India, which ordered the registration of Chinese nationals a few months 
later – a step which, a Bureau report noted, ‘will provide information regarding the numbers of 
Chinese in this country, and will enable intelligence authorities to gauge the size of the 
problem with which they are faced in improving information about them’.15 The ‘Japanese’ 
section of the weekly DIB reports was subsequently renamed ‘Japanese and Chinese’, and 
information concerning a wide range of issues was now recorded, including illegal Chinese 
immigration to India, Chinese attitudes towards Congress and Chinese intelligence gathering in 
India. At one point, concerns over public order were also raised. A report from January 1943 
drew attention to an episode of friction between Indian and Chinese workers on a crowded 
train between Sealdah and Kanchrapara, where many Chinese workers were employed in RAF 
workshops. Believed to be the result of ‘the superior attitude adopted by Chinese technicians 
and craftsmen whose earnings are often three times those of Indians doing similar work’, when 
the train came to an emergency stop some 2,000 Indians were reported to have attacked a 
group of 500 Chinese, resulting in serious injuries to a handful of those concerned, while a 
larger number ‘received injuries which required treatment at a hospital’, alongside the theft of 
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money and personal possessions.16 In April 1943, the Bureau’s thoughts turned to the 
implications for post-war India. Under the sub-heading of ‘Chinese intelligence activities in 
India – Restaurants’, its weekly survey drew attention to ‘large numbers of Chinese seamen’ 
who ‘have left their ships and are living unemployed in certain Indian ports’. With ‘no desire to 
return to sea’, many of them had set up restaurants. Looking ahead to the end of the war, the 
report noted that ‘there is but little doubt that those who are able to establish flourishing 
business connections may make determined efforts to stay on. The possibility of their being 
used in connection with the Chinese cultural approach to India or as a cover for the collection 
of commercial intelligence (for Chinese post-war planning and expansion) has been 
suggested’.17 During a discussion about the problem in the summer of 1944, Sir Denys 
Pilditch, Director of the Bureau, noted that ‘the Chinese Government are extremely interested 
in India’s internal problems and the steady infiltration of Chinese into India, mostly through 
illegal channels, is one which is a continual source of worry to the Central Government of 
India’.18 
As noted above, it was possible for the Bureau to frame some of its interest in Chinese 
affairs within a imperial security context – no less a figure than Chiang Kai-Shek himself 
touched a nerve through his support for Indian independence. Churchill was keen that Chiang 
should make speeches ‘which favoured the British line’ during a visit to India in 1942. Chiang 
did not cooperate, choosing instead to make clear ‘his preference for the nationalist leaders 
over his colonial hosts’, and turning somersaults at a picnic with Nehru.19 He continued to 
make further interjections into Indian politics in support of Congress that came to the attention 
of both the Government of India and the War Cabinet in London. Later in the year, at a 
meeting with the British Ambassador following the arrest of the Congress leadership, he ‘urged 
that a peaceful solution should still be sought’, stating that China ‘could not assume a policy 
which would estrange Indian feeling, and that it was important that Indians should feel that one 
member, at least, of the Allied nations was in sympathy with them’. To that end, he ‘asked that 
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personal messages from himself should be delivered to the Indian leaders under arrest’, a 
request Linlithgow refused. The Ambassador was subsequently ‘instructed to represent 
strongly to the Generalissimo that attempts by the Chinese Government to communicate 
directly with the Congress leaders of [sic] publish statements in China displaying sympathy 
with the Congress party must, in the existing circumstances, seriously handicap the effort of 
the Government of India to maintain law and order’.20 It would not have been a great leap to 
associate certain aspects of Chinese behaviour in India with the attitude displayed by the 
Generalissimo; for example, by the end of 1942 the Government of India ‘had increasing 
evidence of Chinese political intrigues in India which involved a serious misuse of diplomatic 
privilege’; the Chinese Commissioner ‘had been handing messages to the Indian press 
criticising Government handling of the Indian internal problem, while his Principal Secretary 
was known to have Congress connections and to be employing members of Congress in his 
office’.21 While the security intelligence authorities could find examples of dubious behaviour 
on the part of elements of India’s Chinese population, it was more difficult for them to explain 
what lay behind it. In this regard, there appears to have been little more sophisticated on offer 
than a vague notion of ‘advantage’, be it on a national or personal level, that was heavily 
reinforced through disparaging, stereotypical remarks about the Chinese character, which 
emphasised such traits as opportunism and self-interest. When discussing Chinese support for 
independence in October 1942, Lord Linlithgow described the Chinese as ‘poker players. Their 
sole interest in this business is the future of China’.22 In July 1941 the Intelligence Bureau drew 
attention to the ‘report of a secret agent’ which detailed ‘considerable agitation’ against the 
Chinese Consul-General at Calcutta, C.C. Huang, among the local Chinese population on 
account of his ‘strict investigation’ of passport applications. It was believed that the action was 
sponsored by ‘certain Chinese merchants in Calcutta’ who, having tried to cheat customs 
regulations, discovered that Huang ‘would not play their game and refused to plead for them 
once he had satisfied himself that they had in fact offended against the Customs regulations’.23 
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Rather than pointing to the Consul General’s actions, the agent’s report was considered ‘a 
reminder of the capacity for intrigue of the average Chinese, when a question of personal 
advantage arises’.24 A Weekly Survey distributed by the Bureau in May 1942 drew attention to 
what was considered ‘the casual attitude of the Chinese towards essential regulations and 
formalities’, while a survey from August noted that ‘During the last six months the problem of 
the Chinese in India has become increasingly troublesome’, the situation explained as the result 
of ‘lack of discipline, and open contempt for passport and security regulations’.25 The report 
openly acknowledged that ‘much of the trouble they have caused has not been of direct interest 
to the security authorities’, but nevertheless maintained that ‘a potential threat to security is 
inseparable from the presence of large Chinese communities in areas of military importance’. 
The situation was ‘aggravated by the variety of the Chinese organisations, official and quasi-
official, the constant changes in their personnel, the sometimes rather vague definitions of the 
latter’s duties, and the continuous two-way stream of passenger traffic between China and 
India’. Such confusion provided ‘favourable cover’ not only to ‘those who may be working 
against the Chungking regime or for the enemy’, but also for ‘unscrupulous Chinese, whose 
main preoccupation seems to be to line their own pockets’.26 It was within this existing 
atmosphere of growing concern over Chinese activity in India that Force 136, the Far Eastern 
incarnation of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), came to appreciate its own 
Chinese security problem. 
 
II 
Force 136 was slow to get to grips with security affairs in general, and to appreciate the 
potential security risk posed by its Nationalist Chinese recruits in particular. Formed in the 
aftermath of the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk and the fall of 
France, SOE was designed to both encourage and develop resistance movements in Nazi 
occupied territory, and to carry out targeted acts of sabotage.27 SOE’s immediate focus was 
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occupied Europe, but it was not long before the organisation turned its attention further afield. 
An Oriental Mission was established in Singapore in May 1941, under Valentine Killery. This 
was followed by an India Mission headed by Colin Mackenzie, which took on many of the 
staff of the Oriental Mission following the fall of Singapore to Japanese forces in February 
1942, eventually becoming known as Force 136.28  
Force 136 lacked dedicated Security provision until early 1944, in marked contrast to 
developments at SOE headquarters in London, where a Security Section was established within 
three months of the creation of SOE itself.29 The need for such a section was recognised during 
the summer of 1943, and resulted in the appointment of Lt Col John RE Guild as Chief 
Security Officer, who arrived to take up the position in March 1944, followed by further 
security personnel.30 Considered a ‘shrewd and practical “Business man”’ who possessed 
‘plenty of initiative, drive and cunning’, Guild spent his first three months reviewing the 
security situation in India, visiting all Force 136 establishments.31 He began his first report to 
SOE London by noting that ‘By and large, the operational and internal security of Force 136 is 
good’, describing the mission staff as ‘definitely security minded’.32 However, Guild felt that 
there were certain aspects of security that required further attention. These were the product of 
specific regional circumstances, and he advocated the development of ‘entirely new’ methods 
to address them, arguing that ‘attempts to adapt European methods to the Asiatic field’ would 
prove ineffective.33 Alongside problems caused by geography and language,34 Guild expressed 
concern over the ‘types of agents recruited’; of the 456 recruits currently undergoing training, 
he observed that just under half were Chinese.35 In contrast to the attitude that had previously 
prevailed at the Mission, support from the Nationalist Chinese authorities having initially been 
much appreciated, Guild felt that the Chinese recruits represented ‘by far the most important 
problem facing the Security Section’.36 Beyond a general concern about Chinese security, the 
perceived weakness of which led Guild to observe that ‘we can never be sure that we are not 
infiltrated by Japanese agents’, of more pressing concern was the fact that one of the sources of 
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recruits was Dai Li, Head of the Military Affairs Commission Bureau of Investigation and 
Statistics (MSB, or Jungton), part of Chiang Kai-shek’s intelligence service.37 For Guild, this 
connection constituted a ‘dangerous security problem’: 
There seems to be little doubt that Dai Li’s main interest in supplying us with 
recruits lies in the complementary information he can obtain from them as to 
British plans, both military and political, in the Far East, quite apart from the 
information as to the training and use made of this personnel, which must be 
officially communicated to him.38 
SOE made it a point of policy to ‘abstain from Security measures of a “snooping” character 
and to rely upon close relations between the Security department of the organization and the 
appropriate outside Security authorities to bring to notice any personal Security cases’, 
typically resulting in the involvement of the Security Service (MI5).39 However, neither the 
Intelligence Bureau nor the Chinese Intelligence Wing could adequately fulfil that function for 
Force 136. Despite its reported interest in Chinese affairs, the Bureau lacked a dedicated 
Chinese Section, while the main role of CIW appears to have been censoring mail bound for 
China, simultaneously gathering intelligence from its contents.40 As such, Guild proposed the 
creation of a unit within Force 136 itself, designed to both ‘bring to the surface any possible 
Japanese agents’ and uncover ‘Chinese intelligence methods’.41 This marked a significant 
departure from SOE’s established procedure for dealing with security cases. Nevertheless, it 
was looked upon favourably both within Force 136 and beyond: it received the ‘strong support’ 
of the Commander of the Mission, Colin Mackenzie, while at SOE Headquarters in London the 
plan was approved by the organisation’s Director of Intelligence and Security, Archie Boyle.42 
Perhaps most significantly, the plan won the support of Sir Denys. Aware that the cooperation 
of the Bureau would be ‘essential if anything is to be done in this direction’, Guild had been 
careful to discuss the proposal with him ‘in detail’. Sir Denys recognised that such an 
organisation would ‘doubtless be able to supply the I.B. with some valuable information if our 
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agents were in any way successful in unearthing Chinese intelligence methods in this country’. 
Promising Guild that he would provide ‘all possible help’,43 he proceeded to cable Indian 
Political Intelligence (IPI), the organisation that monitored Indian nationalism across Europe 
and acted as liaison for the Bureau in London, ‘asking that all support may be given to the 
scheme’.44 His support was further reflected in his willingness to share the financial burden 
involved, agreeing to ‘bear cost of administration and all other expenses’.45  
Despite receiving such support, the difficulties experienced in finding the ‘extremely 
highly trained’ officer that Guild believed was needed to run the Section meant that progress 
was slow. Guild thought that such an officer could be provided ‘from one of M.I.5’s affiliated 
organisations which have conducted counter espionage abroad’, but any hopes that MI5 would 
be able to help proved unfounded.46 Forwarding a copy of Guild’s Security Report to ‘Tar’ 
Robertson, Head of MI5’s B1(a) Section, John Senter, Head of SOE Security in London, asked 
whether a suitable officer could be seconded to SOE ‘to deal with the Chinese problem’, noting 
that SOE would be ‘most grateful’ for such help.47 Having recently ‘sent a great many officers 
to work in 21 Army Group’ MI5 did not relish the prospect of losing any more, a sentiment 
that was reflected in Robertson’s reply.48 Such a lack of support from MI5 slowed the scheme 
down considerably, although the organisation appreciated the problem; Robertson 
acknowledged that Tai Li’s intelligence organisation was ‘an extremely good one’, designed 
‘to collect the maximum amount of intelligence that it can from China’s allies’ for transmission 
to Chungking. As far as Robertson was concerned, this made Tai Li a ‘highly undesirable’ 
source of agents ‘from a security point of view’, concluding that it would be ‘better’ for SOE 
‘to have no agents at all’.49 Undeterred by MI5’s concerns, and despite the continued absence 
of a suitable officer to run the Section, a formal application for funding was prepared for 
SOE’s Director of Finance, John Venner, by the Deputy Director for SOE’s Overseas Groups 
and Missions, Lt Col L.F. Sheridan. The scheme was now presented as a collaborative effort 
that would see SOE work in tandem with the Intelligence Bureau. Sheridan explained that it 
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was impractical for SOE to proceed alone (‘our relations with the Chinese would be fatally 
damaged if it became known that we ourselves were enquiring into the Chinese agents or 
contacts that had been provided for us’), but equally unreasonable to expect the Bureau to take 
on the extra work (‘D.I.B’s answer would probably be that while they agreed on the necessity 
for a Chinese Department for general purposes, it is not reasonable to ask them to undertake a 
great deal of work for S.O.E. without S.O.E. making some contribution’). 50 As such, an 
‘amalgam’ was proposed, ‘whereby D.I.B. set up a Chinese Department, receiving some 
assistance, financial or otherwise, from S.O.E.’51 While the main objective of the proposal was 
to bolster Force 136 security, addressing the issue of the ‘numerous Chinese agents and 
supervisors sent out to us…whose loyalty is primarily to the Chinese Government’, it was clear 
that the Government of India also stood to gain: ‘in investigating our problems the Department 
would certainly unearth ramifications not connected with S.O.E. but damaging to the 
Government of India’, including ‘Chinese illegal infiltration into India’, smuggling activity, 
and ‘the activities of the Chinese Intelligence Service in India, which are known to be 
extensive’.52 Both aspects of the scheme were considered to be mutually reinforcing; Sheridan 
explained how ‘in exploring on their own initiative channels by which secret communications 
or money flow from China to India, D.I.B. may well trace sources of leakage of S.O.E. plans’. 
Considered ‘in the nature of an experiment’, funding for the scheme was only requested for 
two years, thereby limiting SOE’s financial liability in the context of a war that was considered 
likely to continue for some time. At the end of this period, ‘the matter would come up for 
review’. Venner approved the proposal.53 
The continuing need for the Section was reiterated by Mackenzie in December. Writing 
to Boyle, he expressed his hope ‘that the right man may be found for the Counter Espionage 
scheme, as I consider it to be of very great importance’. This importance had been heightened 
by the decision to continue training agents in Calcutta. While this had been based on sound 
practical considerations, Mackenzie pointed out that Sir Denys had admitted that ‘security in 
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the Calcutta area is practically out of the question...it is therefore essential that we should do 
everything humanly possible to prevent leakages or interference in connection with our agents. 
GUILD’s scheme is the only way I can see for effectively dealing with this problem’.54 That 
the scheme would benefit the Government of India also continued to stand in its favour. 
Mackenzie suggested that its takeover by the Bureau at the end of the war (‘providing it was 
working properly’) was a fait accompli, and felt that this constituted ‘a strong recommendation 
in its favour’: 
I am sure that the India Office will strongly support the view that there is 
going to be a major Chinese problem in India after the war and an agency of 
this kind would be of great assistance to the Home Department, Government 
of India.55 
Progress was finally made on finding a suitable candidate to run the Section later in the month. 
Sir George Moss, who advised SOE about its work in the region, suggested Lt Col Kenneth 
Morrison Bourne, and enquiries were made about his availability.56 Born in November 1893, 
Bourne had been a member of the Shanghai Municipal Police from 1919, becoming 
Commissioner in 1938.57 In Canada on leave when war broke out, and ‘having his leave pay 
only’, he subsequently found employment with British Security Co-ordination (BSC) in New 
York, the wartime body responsible for liaison between the British and American intelligence 
communities.58 Bourne was described as a ‘first-class executive’ by an unnamed SIS officer, 
and ‘a man of experience and ability’.59 When approached, he proved ‘keen’ to take the job, 
and BSC had ‘no objection’ to his release.60 Bourne arrived in India in February 1945, with 
instructions to report directly to Sir Denys Pilditch, not (‘repeat not’) to Force 136.61 Sir Denys 
wrote to Vickery at IPI on 22 February, noting that Bourne had arrived safely and observing 
that ‘He appears to me just the sort of man we want to help us out in our present difficulty…I 
am extremely grateful to S.O.E. for having arranged to send him over’.62 
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III 
Bourne was introduced at a meeting at the office of the Commissioner of the Calcutta Police, 
Mr Rae, on 24 February.63 The minutes of the meeting record that Rae was initially ‘slightly 
suspicious’ – perhaps unsurprisingly, given that this was the first occasion on which he had 
heard about the plan. However, when it was explained that ‘there were no strings attached...and 
that, in fact, the organisation was initiated to aid the Police in Calcutta while fulfilling a certain 
number of Force 136 intelligence requirements’, Rae became ‘considerably more 
enthusiastic’.64 Overtly part of the Calcutta Police, it was agreed that Bourne’s Section would 
be housed in Security Control, Calcutta. Bourne’s duties were outlined as: 
(a) An investigation of the Chinese Intelligence Service in India, its methods 
and reporting centres. 
(b) An investigation of Chinese underground channels of communication 
between India and China, with special attention to C.N.A.C. [China National 
Aviation Corporation] and Chinese Broadcast Station, Calcutta. 
(c) Surveillance of contacts between Chinese students, agents and supervisors 
employed by Force 136 and other Chinese in India. 
(d) The introduction, for some months, of a C.I.S. agent into Ceylon, to 
observe contacts between Force 136 Chinese and local Chinese and to 
investigate any Chinese underground channels of communication between 
Ceylon and India, or elsewhere. 
(e) The detention of possible Sino-Japanese agents in India.65 
Strict precautions were put in place to ensure that the connection between CIS and Force 136 
remained secret. In all written correspondence, Bourne’s section was to be referred to as 
‘Bristol’. Only nine Force 136 officers were to be told about its existence, while Major K. 
Tosh, a Force 136 Security Officer, was designated as the only contact between Force 136 and 
CIS – and even here contact was to be made through a cut out.66 Such strict secrecy was also to 
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be observed beyond the confines of Force 136. Sir Denys introduced Bourne to Brigadier 
Walter Cawthorn, DMI GHQ India, simply as ‘a new officer transferred to him for special 
duties in Calcutta, without any reference to his present or future contacts with Force 136’, 
while Col Fox Holmes, who as head of the Chinese Intelligence Wing had proved himself ‘a 
trifle too curious about the writers of Chinese letters he was asked to censor’, was also to 
remain unaware of the existence of the new Section. The meeting ‘closed in a good 
atmosphere’, Bourne having ‘made an extremely good impression on all those present’. 
The enthusiasm expressed in Calcutta was not echoed when the minutes were received 
in London, as the duties outlined went far beyond what SOE had been expecting. Boyle felt 
that the directive was ‘far too all-embracing’, noting that points (a), (b) and (e) encroached 
upon the ‘proper functions of an Intelligence-Security Service’.67 He believed that the actual 
‘requirements of Force 136’ were adequately contained within points (c) and (d), and that those 
‘should have sufficed for the directive’.68 Boyle expressed his concerns in a letter to 
Mackenzie, noting that the document strayed far ‘outside any proper S.O.E. charter’. Pointing 
out that ‘we are not a Security authority’, Boyle was keen to avoid treading on departmental 
toes.69 Bourne’s new section also faced early difficulties in India, as it found itself almost 
immediately merged with the existing Chinese Intelligence Wing. 
Little material detailing the subsequent activities of CIS has survived, save for a 
detailed report written by Bourne in August which provides some insight into how the work of 
the Section proceeded to develop, alongside his ‘ideas as to the future’ of the section.70 
Forwarding the report to Mackenzie, in a lengthy covering letter Guild outlined the difficulties 
Bourne had faced. While the proposed amalgamation with CIW had been avoided, the 
Commissioner of the Calcutta Police, Mr Rae, had proceeded to take ‘little or no interest’ in 
the Section, while Bourne also had to work with the ‘notoriously difficult’ Captain Tolson, 
DIB’s representative in Calcutta. ‘Fortunately’, Guild reported, through the exercise of ‘a great 
deal of tact’, Bourne had ‘been able to establish cordial relations’ with him.71 Guild also 
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pointed to the replacement of Sir Denys with the ‘fearsome’ Norman Smith, who ‘certainly’ 
took less interest in the work of the Section than his predecessor.72 
By August, Bourne was running five agents, under the code-names ‘Mayfield’, ‘Robin’, 
‘Heathfield’, ‘Rotherfield’ and ‘Tony’ (who had two sub-agents, both of whom were known as 
‘Chalmers’), and hoped that a further agent, ‘Benenden’, would soon arrive from Chungking.73 
Different agents were used for different aspects of the Section’s work (‘TONY for instance is 
for rough work when a disregard of the letter of the law may be desirable, while MAYFIELD 
obtains information in more respectable circles. ROBIN and HEATHFIELD are good in local 
criminal activity’), and Bourne hoped to ‘obtain a few more agents as opportunity offers 
possibly through the recommendation of satisfactory men already employed’.74 He went on to 
detail the two key activities of his Section. The first dealt with SOE’s concern, through the 
identification of ‘any members of Force 136 Chinese Staff who associated with undesirables or 
who arouse suspicions’. Bourne explained that a Card Index of all Chinese staff had been 
created, allowing for quick identification of those who were a cause of concern. One such 
agent, Liu Po Nan, had been cleared, while another investigation was ongoing. Yet despite 
being the reason why the section had been created, Bourne pointed out that his ability to carry 
out such investigations was limited: 
It is impossible without exposing the connection of this office with Force 136 
to turn my agents on to numerous Chinese in 136 but a few selected cases can 
be managed, and for the rest a continuous check of agents reports with our 
Card Index is the best we can do. 
In contrast, while there were limitations on what could be achieved in relation to the Force 136 
security problem, it became clear that the concerns communicated from London had fallen 
upon deaf ears, as Bourne noted that his section was also ‘extensively engaged’ in a wider 
investigation of ‘the crime and political set up in [the] Calcutta Chinese Community’. His 
investigative work involved twelve separate ‘lines of enquiry’, which included the 
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investigation of suspected Chinese spies (particularly those in contact with British Forces); 
opium gangs; gambling gangs; criminal gangs; smuggling gangs and Chinese secret societies, 
while also keeping abreast of ‘Chinese Policies in Burma, Siam, Malay and India’. The 
development of the Section’s work along these lines was likely influenced by Bourne’s time 
with the Shanghai Municipal Police, a fusion of both his experience of criminal Chinese 
activity and exposure to the prevailing attitudes towards the Chinese population. In terms of 
criminal activity, Bourne could certainly speak with some authority. He pointed to the situation 
that had developed in the French Concession during the late 1920s, when the ‘chief 
gangsters...became so powerful through opium, drugs and gambling, and even kidnapping, that 
they could practically defy their own government’.75 He also drew attention to the connections 
between organised crime and politics, highlighting the case of Tu Yueh-sheng, head of the 
‘Green Gang’ who had assisted Chiang in his purge of Chinese communists from the KMT in 
1927: ‘he did not do this for nothing and he remained the greatest underworld power right up to 
1937’.76 At the same time, Bourne also brought with him something of the prevailing attitude 
towards the Chinese character widely held in interwar Shanghai, which considered all Chinese 
to be ‘unreliable, corrupt, inefficient, inaccurate and so on’.77 Indeed, Robert Bickers has 
drawn attention to the fact that the very terms of service of the Shanghai Municipal Police 
themselves stated that ‘the criminal classes were chiefly Chinese’, and that the Chinese, be they 
members of the police or the general population, ‘needed watching’,78 a view Bourne now 
applied to the situation in India, arguing that its Chinese population ‘needed watching 
continuously’.79 His justification for such surveillance drew heavily upon a stereotype of the 
Chinese character; while having ‘many good qualities’ and being and an ‘agreeable cheerful 
people’, Bourne nevertheless characterised the Chinese as ‘sly and clever...to turn a Chinese 
back if he sights safe profits, whether honest or dishonest, is a major operation’.80 These 
qualities formed the basis of Bourne’s concerns for the future.  
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IV 
Amid the ‘hastily arranged bonfires’ that accompanied the transition to independence, as 
‘Nationalist parties that had previously been the principal targets of colonial security 
organizations were suddenly transformed into their prospective political masters’, the issue of 
covert Chinese activity in India provided a point of continuity, an issue that in many respects 
transcended the question of who was in charge.81 Bourne believed that Chinese activities in 
India ‘should be kept under supervision so long as British interests are in any way concerned’, 
which meant looking beyond the cessation of hostilities. He argued that ‘organised counter 
intelligence’ should continue post-war as he was in ‘no doubt’ that the Chinese Nationalists 
were ‘taking a great interest in their “Overseas Chinese”’, and that ‘So long as British interests 
are concerned it will be of first importance to be a jump ahead of K.M.T. plans to exploit 
British Political difficulties to their own advantage’. Bourne saw a threat that would only be 
heightened by the end of British rule, arguing that ‘there is little doubt both the K.M.T. and 
individual Chinese have an eye on India, Burma, Ceylon and the Strait Settlements in the hope 
that with lessening British control they may step in’.82 
A similar point was made in London by a staff officer on SOE’s Far East desk, 
codename AD6, in September 1945, by which point the question of the post-war future of CIS 
was being given urgent attention. Following the Japanese surrender, it constituted an 
unnecessary expense that SOE’s Director of Finance, John Venner, was keen to put an end to 
as quickly as possible.83 In a lengthy paper, the officer outlined a number of points which he 
considered ‘sufficiently convincing to justify the retention of Bristol (or a similar organisation), 
whether it be retained solely for U.K. and/or Commonwealth interests or for the more narrow 
interests of India alone’.84 While the prospect of an independent India had obvious implications 
for the existing British intelligence machinery, the officer argued that such covert Chinese 
activity would continue, irrespective of who held power: 
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The necessity to watch Chinese activities in all countries in the Far East is not 
only in the interests of the British Commonwealth, but is a direct interest to 
India. It is a necessity that surely will assume greater importance if India 
should become an independent, self-governing unit in the Commonwealth. 
Therefore apart from the more general aspect of the importance of watching 
Chinese activities, it would be a great mistake for India to omit their share of 
the observation.85 
Echoing the arguments previously put forward by Bourne, the officer noted that both 
Nationalist and Communist Chinese alike would ‘doubtless maintain close contact with all 
Chinese communities in the Far East outside China’, and use these ‘in the interests (a) of party 
politics in China, (b) of Chinese aspirations and (c) of Chinese diplomatic relations with other 
powers’. In this context, he argued that Bourne’s surveillance work could continue to serve a 
useful purpose: 
There surely is no doubt but that intelligence derived from observation upon 
Chinese communities outside China will not only throw light upon more 
localised activities and aspirations, but may reflect indications of likely major 
direction of Chinese policy and her diplomatic relations with others to 
achieve this policy. 
The officer also reminded his readers of Chiang’s 1942 visit to India, after which the 
importance attached by the Nationalists to its relationships with Indian politicians, ‘particularly 
with those of the Congress Party’, had become increasingly apparent. Such links, he argued, 
would continue to represent a ‘potential weapon’ against Britain and the Commonwealth: ‘The 
Chinese have associated themselves with India in condemning “imperialism” and they would 
have no scruples should they wish to make difficulties for the Commonwealth by endeavouring 
to use India to embarrass and inconvenience the British or the Empire as a whole if they 
thought it suited their purposes’.86 Boyle agreed that it was ‘in the interests of...all clandestine 
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departments and of the Government of India and of H.M.G. to keep alive and to improve an 
organisation of the Bristol type’.87 However, it proved impossible to persuade any of the 
relevant organisations to take it on; neither the Security Service nor SIS were interested, while 
the new Director of the Intelligence Bureau, Norman Smith, proceeded to haggle over financial 
responsibility. 
On 28 December, with SOE itself a matter of days away from dissolution, Gubbins 
cabled Brigadier John Anstey, the deputy head of Force 136 who was wrapping up its affairs in 
India, with the instruction that the liquidation of CIS was to be completed by 31 December. 
Any agents required by the Intelligence Bureau were to be taken on by them by that date, while 
Bourne was instructed to return to the UK, where SOE would ‘try and find him another job to 
suit his circumstances’.88 Anstey responded with a telegram to Boyle the following day, 
outlining a shift in Smith’s position concerning the Bureau taking financial responsibility for 
the Section.89 However, such horse-trading was now academic; a scribbled note across the top 
of an otherwise heavily redacted letter, dated 2 January 1946, recorded that ‘[Venner] has rung 
up to say that SOE in liquidation cannot and will not pay for this – it is up to DOB[sic]/SIS’.90 
It is unclear whether the Intelligence Bureau proceeded to take on any of Bourne’s agents, 
while Bourne himself returned to the UK on 22 January.91  
The demise of CIS did not mark the end of Bourne’s involvement with Indian security 
affairs. Through the recent release of the post-war diaries of Guy Liddell, wartime Director of 
MI5’s B Division, it is clear that Bourne continued to press his views on the threat posed by 
covert Chinese activity as an officer of the Security Service. On 24 January Bourne met with 
Liddell, who recorded the meeting in his diary. Much of their discussion focussed on the work 
of the Bureau, and concerns over Chinese activity. Bourne explained that the organisation was 
‘so much concerned with the Congress Party and internal politics that they gave little thought 
to the activities of the Chinese’, such as gambling houses, on which the Bureau ‘took the view 
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that all Chinese gambled and that there was nothing to be done’. Warming to his well-
rehearsed theme, Bourne pointed out that ‘this was exactly how bandit armies started’: 
They began by having guards to look after gambling houses and then some 
potential warlord got control of all these guards and started to run various 
rackets. Ultimately he became extremely rich and a great power in the land. 
Bourne had seen this happen in Shanghai over and over again. In his view the 
only thing to do was to nip it in the bud.92 
Surveillance of India’s Chinese population could also, Bourne believed, help secure the post-
independence future of the Bureau. However, he had found little support for his arguments: 
The fact is that Civil Servants in India are so disheartened by the general 
trend of things that they are not bothering very much, although if DIB are to 
survive they could sell themselves much better to any Indian Govt. if they had 
a knowledge of attempts at penetration by the Chinese than if their knowledge 
was merely confined to Indian organisations.93 
Liddell was clearly impressed by Bourne, recording that he ‘might be extremely valuable to us 
as a Chinese adviser at SIFE’, the recently established multi-agency organisation which served 
as a central point for both collating and distributing intelligence related to British interests in 
the Far East.94 At an MI5 staff meeting held on 7 February it was agreed that Bourne ‘should 
be taken on as head of SIFE or DSO Singapore for two years’. From available archival 
material, the nature of his eventual appointment remains unclear.95  
 With independence fast approaching and following considerable discussion over the 
future of intelligence from India, an agreement was reached whereby MI5 could appoint a 
liaison officer with the Intelligence Bureau.96 On 4 June, Liddell attended a meeting of the 
Joint Intelligence Sub Committee, at which he reported on his recent tour of both the Far East 
and Middle East. He informed the JIC that, after discussing the matter with Smith, he had 
visited Sardr Patel, who was soon to take responsibility for the Intelligence Bureau, ‘and put to 
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him the suggestion that the Security Service should appoint a liaison officer with D.I.B.’ While 
Patel had agreed to this, Smith had unexpectedly thrown a spanner in the works by suggesting 
to him ‘that the British liaison officer should be someone who had had no previous connection 
with the Indian Police or the India Civil Service, so as to avoid any grounds for suspicion. It 
was hoped nevertheless to fill the appointment with a man who had had some experience in 
India’.97 It was not too great a stretch to fit Bourne to this criteria. On 30 June 1947, Liddell 
recorded that agreement had been reached within MI5 that Bourne was ‘the most suitable 
person’ to become the Security Liaison Officer (SLO), and it was suggested that he ‘should 
come home for briefing at once and take up his position in Delhi on August 1st’, on which date 
it was also proposed that MI5 would absorb IPI.98 Both suggestions received the approval of 
the newly appointed Director General, Sir Percy Sillitoe.99 In mid July, Liddell lunched with 
Bourne and Vickery, and subsequently saw the DG with Bourne. Liddell recorded that 
Bourne’s terms of reference were ‘being worked out by I.P.I.’,100 and Bourne departed for 
Delhi on 29 July.101 It soon became apparent that the job would not be without its teething 
problems. In October, Liddell recorded a discussion based on a note received from Bourne ‘in 
which he points out the difficulties of getting any information on internal affairs in India 
without arousing suspicion. Officials in D.I.B. were obviously self-conscious about the whole 
thing. He thought it unwise to press them, particularly since the attitude of ‘I told you so’ has 
caused a certain amount of resentment against British officials’.102 Bourne did not remain as 
liaison officer for very long; on 5 December, Liddell recorded that Bill U’ren was to succeed 
him as SLO.103 
 By the time of Bourne’s departure as the first SLO in newly independent India, he 
would in all likelihood have been satisfied that the recently formed Security Intelligence Far 
East (SIFE) had turned its attention towards ‘Chinese activities’ as one of its three main 
subjects of study, alongside ‘Communism’ and ‘Russian Activities’.104 However, as Bourne’s 
reports from New Delhi have not survived, while surviving SIFE material is only now starting 
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to appear in the public domain, it is currently impossible to expand further.105 While further 
research in the archives of the Intelligence Bureau itself would be necessary in order to chart 
post-Independence developments, it appears that the rise of Mao and China’s turn to 
Communism went some way towards taking the edge off the security threat posed by India’s 
Chinese population. While it was considered ‘likely’ that India’s Nationalist Chinese would 
‘transfer their allegiance to any Government in China (whether Communist or a Communist-
dominated Coalition) which may emerge’, the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) 
concluded that, provided that the Communist Party of India continued to be classed as an 
illegal organisation, developments in China were unlikely to have a significant impact in 
India.106 This sentiment was shared by Krishna Menon, who in a detailed letter to Sir Archibald 
Nye noted that, with China engaged in a period of ‘political consolidation and economic 
rehabilitation’, India ‘need not therefore fear any serious danger from China directly in the near 
future’.107 
 A study of SOE’s efforts to address suspicions concerning its Chinese recruits 
ultimately casts an interesting sidelight on security intelligence in India in the twilight years of 
the British empire. The need for CIS, in the absence of a Chinese Section of the Intelligence 
Bureau, illustrates how poorly prepared the Indian security authorities were to deal with threats 
that did not conveniently fit within the parameters drawn by colonial rule; the Chinese were 
not, yet, of concern on account of Communism, while Chiang Kai Shek’s support for Congress 
and an independent India appears to have seen him regarded as an irritant to be scolded about 
his behaviour, rather than a serious threat to the established order. It can be suggested that this 
lack of an immediate, explicit imperial dimension to the threat likely goes some way towards 
explaining the short life of CIS, and the reluctance of any of the permanent organs of the 
security-intelligence apparatus to adopt it upon the dissolution of SOE in early 1946. The 
subject also brings up a further, tangential point of interest, in terms of the organisational 
make-up of CIS and its remit, as the body essentially combined security intelligence with 
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criminal investigation. Walton and Andrew note that ‘colonial policing, which involved law 
and order, was not the same as imperial security intelligence, which involved national security, 
and operated in a realm outside the confines of law enforcement’.108 While that may more 
usually be the case, the Chinese Intelligence Section illustrates a body whose activities very 
clearly blurred the boundaries between these two worlds. 
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